Journal and Proceedings of
The Royal Society of New South Wales
Volume 128 Parts 1 and 2 [Issued June 1995]
CONTENTS
| AUTHORS & TITLES | PAGES |
| Bennett, Max R. The Neuroscience of Syntax, Semantics and Qualia (Brain and Mind: Descartes and Kant) | 1-12 |
| Bennett, Max R. The Binding Problem and Consciousness: Neuroscience of Attention | 13-28 |
| Gray, C.M. Discussion of "Lachlan and New England: Fold Belts of Contrasting Magmatic and Tectonic Development" by B.W.Chappell | 29-32 |
| Grover OBE, John C. Review of book "Ore Elements in Arc Lavas" by R.L.Stanton [Not reproduced here] |
33-35 |
| Theses Abstracts [Not reproduced on this page, but available here] | |
| Hurdal, Monica K. Dipole Modelling for the Localization of Human Visual Evoked Scalp Potential Sources | 36-28 |
| Wang, Jinxian, Population Dynamics of Steinernema carpocapsae and Heterorhabditis bacteriophora in in vivo and in vitro culture | 39 |
| Mahony, Robert, Optimization Algorithms on Homogeneous Spaces: with Application in Linear Systems Theory | 40 |
| Scrivener, Andrew M. Wood Digestion in Panesthia aribrata | 41-42 |
| Douglas, Andrea M. The Development of Mutation Detection Techniques and their Application to Disease Diagnosis | 43 |
| Kidd, Susan E. Development of Metal Chelates as Potential Probes of DNA Structure | 44 |
vol 128 pts 1-2 pp.1-12
The Neuroscience of Syntax, Semantics and Qualia. Brain and Mind: Descartes and Kant.
Max R. Bennett
(with illustrations by Gillian Bennett)
Descartes (Figure 1) first posed the dualistic problem of the relationship between the brain, treated as an object for physical study, and consciousness. Kant (Figure 2) analyzed this problem further by distinguishing between sensory information, such as temperature and vision, that we receive through the excitation of different classes of sensory receptors and those activities that categorize these experiences as belonging to, for example, substances or to causal relations. To the first of these he gave the name Sensibilities and to the latter Categories of Understanding. Kant thought that the gathering of Sensibilities was most likely carried out by physical processes whereas the mind uses its Categories of Understanding to construct our awareness and comprehension of the physical world from the Sensibilities. The reception of sensory information and its early processing by the nervous system is generally agreed to be a physical procedure. This is thought to obey procedures that have a clear syntactical structure. Such a structure involves a systematic statement of the rules governing the formulas of a logical system, like those that determine the arrangement of words and phrases in sentences, or the organization of computer programs. On the other hand, our comprehension of the physical world requires understanding the meaning of signs and symbols, including things like sentences and words; this is the problem of semantics. At perhaps an even more complex level, there are also feelings and sensations that accompany our awareness of the world; the set of these that are associated with a particular object are called qualia.
The question arises as to whether the procedures of semantics or the development of qualia are clearly such that they are carried out by physical means, like those generally agreed to be responsible for the syntactical mechanisms in the nervous system involved in the generation of sensations. This essay is concerned then with the problem of how might syntax, semantics and qualia arise in the nervous system.
vol 128 pts 1-2 pp.13-28
The Binding Problem and Consciousness: Neuroscience of Attention
Max R. Bennett
When viewing an attractive scene, such as a garden, one is aware of particular trees, shrubs and perhaps even flowers. It is extraordinary that we can attend to just these named objects in the garden amongst the enormous number of visua1 impressions that our retinas receive from the scene. For there is nothing really to distinguish the photons which reach our retinas from say the bark on a tree and those from the shrubs surrounding it. What is it then that allows us to experience the tree as an holistic structure? What neural processes bind together its trunk, boughs and leaves into a single entity which is readily identifiable from the surrounding and sometimes partially enveloping shrubs? This is referred to as the binding problem. Clearly the binding problem can be considered at other levels of holistic experiences. For example, a breeze may occur that produces a rustle as it passes over the leaves of the tree. In this case we may be conscious of both the visual identity of the tree, involving our visual cortex, as well as the sound of the rustle of its leaves, involving our auditory cortex. How is it in this case that we have an holistic experience which involves two quite different areas of our brains? This essay is concerned with what solutions to the binding problem are now offered by neuroscience.
vol 128 pts 1-2 pp.29-32
Discussion of 'Lachlan and New England: Fold Belts of Contrasting Magmatic and Tectonic Development' By B.W. Chappell
C.M. Gray
Introductory paragraphs. Chappell (1994) (Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 127, 47-59) presents a review of the magmatic and tectonic development of the Lachlan and New England Orogenic Belts. The genetic model espoused for the granitic rocks in this, and numerous other publications, recognises fundamentally different S- and I-type granites, such that 'S-type granites were effectively derived exclusively from sedimentary material within the crust', and I-type granites formed 'by fractional melting of previously solidified mantle-derived material'.
The main alternative view to the Chappell model is that of Gray (1984, 1990), a postulate that granite genesis involved a crustally-derived component, a magma akin to the Cooma Granodiorite and formed by melting metasedimentary rocks, which interacts with basalt magma. In a discussion of the genesis of granitic rocks in the Lachlan Orogenic Belt (LOB) Chappell (1994) purports to disprove this hypothesis. Unfortunately, Chappell misconstrues significant parts of the Gray (1984) model and as a result his criticism is invalid.